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RE-IMAGINING THE MORALITY OF MANAGEMENT: A MODERN 
VIRTUE ETHICS APPROACH 
 
Geoff Moore 
 
Abstract: In this paper the problematic nature of the morality of management, in 
particular related to business organisations operating under Anglo-American 
capitalism, is explored. MacIntyre‟s critique of managers in After Virtue (1985) serves 
as the starting point but this critique is itself subjected to analysis leading to a more 
balanced and contemporary view of the morality of management than MacIntyre 
provides. Paradoxically perhaps, MacIntyre‟s own virtues-goods-practice-institution 
schema is shown to provide a way of re-imagining business organisations and 
management and thereby holds out the possibility of resolving the issue of the 
morality of management within such organisations. Implications for management 
practice are drawn out. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The British newspaper The Observer carried the following as part of an article 
published on 9 April 1944. It referred to Albert Speer, Hitler‟s Minister for armaments 
and war production. It suggested that even though Speer was not one of the more 
flamboyant Nazis, he was more important to Germany than Hitler, Himmler, Goering, 
or the generals. For Speer 
 
“is very much the successful average man, well-dressed, civil, noncorrupt, 
very middle class in his style of life, with a wife and six children. Much less 
than any of the other German leaders does he stand for anything particularly 
German or particularly Nazi. He rather symbolises a type which is becoming 
increasingly important in all belligerent countries: the pure technician, the 
classless bright young man without background, with no other original aim 
than to make his way in the world and no other means than his technical and 
managerial ability. It is the lack of psychological and spiritual ballast, and the 
ease with which he handles the terrifying technical and organizational 
 2 
machinery of our age, which makes this type go extremely far nowadays  … 
This is their age; the Hitlers, the Himmlers we may get rid of, but the Speers, 
whatever happens to this particular special man, will long be with us.” (Cited 
in Hauerwas 2001: 214) 
 
This quote, and the “calculating instinct” associated with it (see ten Bos & Willmott 
2001: 782),
1
  brings home with some force the issue with which this paper is 
concerned – the amorality, or perhaps better and more hopefully, the morality of 
management. Although I will suggest at the end that the model of management, and 
hence the morality of management, that I propose has universal application, the paper 
confines itself to the problematic nature of the morality of management in business 
organisations operating under Anglo-American capitalism. The paper seeks to provide 
a resolution to this issue by putting in place an overarching conceptual framework, 
drawing on the work of the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, within which the 
morality of management can be situated and given substantive content. I term this a 
modern virtue ethics approach (see also Moore 2002; 2005a; 2005b).  
 
The paper is in four main parts. It begins with the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and, in 
particular, his contention that the morality of modernity is one of emotivism and that 
this is revealed nowhere better than in the character of the manager found in 
bureaucratic organisations. His apparently devastating critique, however, is in need of 
tempering and up-dating and so the second part of the paper introduces MacIntyre‟s 
critics, reviews the contemporary debate on bureaucracy and summarises 
contemporary approaches to management and management ethics. The conclusion 
from this is that a more nuanced account of MacIntyre‟s critique does have continuing 
application and relevance; the morality of management in business organisations 
under Anglo-American capitalism continues to be problematic. The third part of the 
paper, then, looks at MacIntyre‟s own conceptual virtues-goods-practice-institution 
schema and demonstrates how it has the potential to provide an answer to the 
problem. The implications of this schema for management in general, and the 
morality of management in particular, are then discussed in the fourth part, before 
conclusions are drawn. 
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I. MacIntyre – emotivism and the critique of management 
 
MacIntyre‟s critique of management is set within the context of his broader critique of 
modernity. Here he contends that we live in what he refers to as a specifically 
emotivist culture. Emotivism “is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more 
specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, 
expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character” 
(MacIntyre 1985: 11-12, emphasis in original). As such, we attempt to align the 
attitudes, feelings, preferences and choices of others with our own – “others are 
always means, never ends” (ibid.: 24) – and hence emotivism “entails the obliteration 
of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social 
relations” (ibid.: 23). In other words, since there is no content to moral judgments 
other than the preference of the subject, social relations inevitably become 
manipulative, the subject treating the object merely as a means to his or her own ends.  
 
This is, of course, both a powerful but also a contentious critique of modernity. 
However, it is reinforced by post-modern perspectives. Bauman, for example, argues 
that there are “many agencies, and many ethical standards, whose presence casts the 
individual in a condition of moral uncertainty from which there is no completely 
satisfactory, foolproof exit … the modern individual [is] bombarded by conflicting 
moral demands, options and cravings, with responsibility for actions landing back on 
her shoulders” (1993: 31). Thus, in an organisational context, even ethically aware 
managers and organisations will find themselves inhabiting “moral mazes” (Jackall 
1988), “where individuals are confronted with a plethora of maps through the maze, 
each vying for attention, none of which is able to provide monologically reliable 
guides to the territories that they purport to represent” (Clegg & Rhodes 2006: 5). It 
is, however, MacIntyre‟s particular contribution to identify the manipulative form that 
such a context, with no moral meta-narrative, leads to. 
 
MacIntyre continues from this point by arguing that moral philosophies often find 
their embodiment in particular characters (the emphasis is his) – “they are, so to 
speak, the moral representatives of their culture and they are so because of the way in 
which moral and metaphysical ideas and theories assume through them an embodied 
existence in the social world. Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies” 
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(MacIntyre 1985: 28).
2
 While the character “morally legitimates a mode of social 
existence” (ibid.: 29) it is also the case that characters will not secure universal 
assent. On the contrary “it is partly because they provide focal points for disagreement 
that they are able to perform their defining task” (ibid.: 31). And the particular 
character that MacIntyre draws attention to as the embodiment of emotivism and, 
indeed, as “that dominant figure of the contemporary scene” (ibid.: 74), is that of the 
Manager.  
 
The managers to which MacIntyre refers exist inside bureaucratic organisations, each 
of which (business organisations of any form and government agencies alike) is 
“characteristically engaged in a competitive struggle for scarce resources to put to the 
service of its predetermined ends. It is therefore a central responsibility of managers 
to direct and redirect their organizations‟ available resources, both human and non-
human, as effectively as possible towards those ends” (ibid.: 25). But this means that 
“the manager represents in his character [as the embodiment of emotivism] the 
obliteration of the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social 
relations … The manager treats ends as given, as outside his scope; his concern is 
with technique, with effectiveness in transforming raw materials into final products, 
unskilled labor into skilled labor, investment into profits” (ibid.: 30). It will be 
apparent that there are strong resonances between MacIntyre‟s description and the 
Speer quotation with which this paper began. 
 
While this critique of management and bureaucratic organisations occurs in After 
Virtue, it forms only a part of a consistent line of argument. In an earlier article, for 
example, MacIntyre makes similar points when he states that, “in his capacity of 
corporate executive, the manager not only has no need to take account of, but must not 
take account of certain types of considerations which he might feel obliged to 
recognize were he acting as parent, as consumer, or as citizen” (MacIntyre 1979: 126, 
emphasis in original). Later, MacIntyre cites the example of power company 
executives unable to consider a reduction in the overall levels of power consumption 
even though, as parents and concerned citizens in other spheres of activity, they might 
well regard this as desirable (MacIntyre 1999: 322) – an example of 
“compartmentalisation” that we will consider further below. Hence, managers, in their 
role as manager neither do nor “are able to engage in moral debate. They are seen by 
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themselves, and by those who see them with the same eyes as their own, as 
uncontested figures, who purport to restrict themselves to the realms in which rational 
agreement is possible – that is, of course from their point of view to the realm of fact, 
the realm of means, the realm of measurable effectiveness” (MacIntyre 1985: 30). 
 
MacIntyre continues his critique of managers in After Virtue when he contends that 
managers are accepted as morally neutral characters who are skilled at being effective 
whatever the ends may be. But he counters that effectiveness is not a morally neutral 
value and is instead inevitably linked with the manipulation of other human beings 
into compliant patterns of behaviour. It is “by appeal to such effectiveness in this 
respect that the manager claims his authority within the manipulative mode” (ibid.: 
74). The lack of any kind of critical concern with the ends of their activity, and the 
morally questionable manipulation of human beings as a means of bringing about 
those unquestioned ends might seem, in itself, to be a sufficiently strong and damning 
critique to condemn management as not just amoral but as essentially immoral. 
However, MacIntyre has yet one more nail to drive into the coffin of the manager as 
character. For “the claim that the manager makes to effectiveness [and hence to any 
kind of legitimate authority] rests of course on the further claim to possess a stock of 
knowledge by means of which organizations and social structures can be moulded … 
There are thus two parts to the manager‟s claims to justified authority. One concerns 
the existence of a domain of morally neutral fact about which the manager is to be 
expert”. The other concerns knowledge of “a set of law-like generalizations which 
would enable the manager to predict that, if an event or state of affairs of a certain 
type were to occur or be brought about, some other event or state of affairs of some 
specific kind would result” (ibid.: 77).  
 
For this to be true, the manager would have to operate under conditions similar to 
those that apply in the natural sciences where facts and cause-effect generalisations 
are, of course, entirely conventional.
3
  But via an extended discussion of fact, 
explanation and expertise (ibid.: 79-87) in which, if there is to be a science of human 
behaviour it “must be formulated in a vocabulary which omits all reference to 
intentions, purposes and reasons for action” (ibid.: 83), so that facts which are not 
morally neutral are presented as if they were, and in anticipation of an equally 
extended discussion of the character of generalizations in social science and their 
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(lack of) predictive power (ibid.: 88-106), MacIntyre concludes that “the salient fact 
about those sciences is the absence of the discovery of any law-like generalizations 
whatsoever” (ibid.: 88).  
 
This sweeping critique of the lack of achievement in the social sciences, which 
MacIntyre explains in terms of four different sources of systematic unpredictability in 
human affairs (ibid.: 93-100),
4
 is then followed by the application of the same critique 
to managers: “The expert‟s claim to status and reward is fatally undermined when we 
recognise that he possesses no sound stock of law-like generalizations and when we 
realise how weak the predictive power available to him is. The concept of managerial 
effectiveness is after all one more contemporary moral fiction and perhaps the most 
important of them all” (ibid.: 106-7). Thus, “the realm of managerial expertise is one 
in which what purport to be objectively-grounded claims function in fact as 
expressions of arbitrary, but disguised, will and preference” (ibid.: 107), or in other 
words, “effectiveness is part of a masquerade of social control rather than a reality” 
(ibid.: 75), such that “it is histrionic success which gives power and authority in our 
culture. The most effective bureaucrat is the best actor” (ibid.: 107). And this 
conclusion takes us back to MacIntyre‟s earlier conclusion “that another moral fiction 
– and perhaps the most culturally powerful of them all – is embodied in the claims to 
effectiveness and hence to authority made by that central character of the modern 
social drama, the bureaucratic manager. To a disturbing extent our morality will be 
disclosed as a theatre of illusions” (ibid.: 76-7). 
 
In MacIntyre‟s earlier article based on empirical work with power company 
executives (MacIntyre 1979 and see also MacIntyre 1977), although the criticism of 
modernity is as strong, there does appear, however, to be some sympathy for 
managers who are, in a sense, locked inside such bureaucratic organisations and hence 
into such pre-defined roles. MacIntyre makes the point that, “every society of course 
has invited individuals to inhabit roles with different requirements. But difference has 
not entailed the kind of separation, the kind of partitioning which is peculiar to 
corporate modernity” (MacIntyre 1979: 132).5  
 
“The outcome”, according to MacIntyre, “is the creation of more than one self. The 
agent has to fabricate distinct characters” and, “in the modern corporate organization 
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character has become more like a mask or a suit of clothing; an agent may have to 
possess more than one”. Thus he argues that, “when the executive shifts from the 
sphere of the family to that of the corporation he or she necessarily shifts moral 
perspective” (ibid.: 127). Drawing again on the theatrical metaphor, MacIntyre adds 
that he wants “to insist on the importance of seeing contemporary life as a theatre with 
a set of adjoining stages upon which a number of very different moral philosophical 
dramas are being acted out, the actors being required to switch from stage to stage, 
from character to character, often with astonishing rapidity” (ibid.: 127-8). The 
manager, we may infer, suffers more than most. 
 
This, therefore, gives a sense of MacIntyre‟s concern for the effect of corporate 
modernity on the people who actually inhabit the role of manager. To use Deetz‟s 
phrase, MacIntyre sees them as “a kind of „homeless‟ manager who is cut loose from 
any community” (1995: 222) or, perhaps better, as “divided selves” (Beadle 2002: 
48). Such division precludes one of the essential features of the moral agent, that of 
the fixed and largely unchanging nature of character (MacIntyre 1979: 125), in which 
“I have to understand myself as and to present myself to others as someone with an 
identity other than the identities of role and office that I assume in each of the roles 
that I occupy. I have to understand myself as someone who brings with her or himself 
to each role qualities of mind and character that belong to her or him qua individual 
and not qua role-player” (MacIntyre 1999: 315). To avoid this potential for what we 
might term moral stress, the virtues of integrity and constancy are required. Integrity 
requires us to be the same person in each and every context, while constancy requires 
us to “pursue the same goods through extended periods of time” (ibid.: 317-8). 
 
The problem is therefore one of “compartmentalisation”, noted above. MacIntyre 
speaks of two moral systems, that of the “established social order with its assignment 
of roles and responsibilities” (within which we may include that of manager in 
bureaucratic organisations), and by contrast “that developed within those milieus in 
which that assignment has been put to question”, such milieus including “the 
everyday life of certain kinds of family and household, of certain kinds of workplace, 
of certain kinds of school and church, and of a variety of kinds of local community” 
(ibid.: 318). This leads to compartmentalisation in which “each distinct sphere of 
social activity comes to have its own role structure governed by its own specific 
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norms in relative independence of other such spheres. Within each sphere those norms 
dictate which kind of consideration are to be treated as relevant to decision-making 
and which are to be excluded” (ibid.: 322). The manager is, on this view, caught by 
inhabiting at least two moral systems in one of which – in his or her role as manager 
within a bureaucratic organisation – he or she cannot engage in debate about ends and, 
because there are no morally neutral facts and no law-like generalizations on which to 
draw, must use manipulative forms of social relations in order to achieve the given 
ends by the most effective and efficient means available.  
 
We can summarise MacIntyre‟s characterisation of managers, then, in Beadle‟s 
helpful words, as follows: “First, that the character of the manger eschews any 
substantive notion of the good. Second, that the manager‟s role is to deploy 
supposedly impersonal facts in pursuit of the most effective and efficient means to 
achieve any prescribed ends but that the sort of morally neutral knowledge required to 
achieve such manipulation does not exist. Third that management is one of the most 
powerful myths of the modern order and finally that managers themselves inhabit a 
deep personal compartmentalisation without which their social role could not be 
understood” (Beadle 2002: 45-6). 
 
We are faced, then, with two issues. The first is to assess whether and to what extent 
MacIntyre is correct in his analysis and critique of corporate modernity and the 
position of the manager within it. For it is probably apparent that MacIntyre makes 
certain claims that go considerably deeper than those generally recognised in the 
management ethics literature, claims that require not so much the resolving of the 
morality of management, but, to use Parker‟s phrase (2002: 210) that we will come to 
below, its re-imagining. And this links to the second issue which, if MacIntyre is in 
any way correct, is to begin to construct an answer that, given the highly damning 
nature of his critique, does something other than simply amount to throwing up one‟s 
hands in horror, frustration or despair. It is to the first of these issues that we turn. 
 
 
II. The morality of management – tempering and up-dating MacIntyre’s critique 
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It may be helpful to analyse MacIntyre‟s critique of management in three stages. First, 
there is an existing body of work which critiques MacIntyre directly. Second, it is also 
worth commenting on recent work on bureaucracy since, as we have seen, it is the 
bureaucratic organisation that provides the immediate context for MacIntyre‟s critique 
of the manager. Third we will, of course, need to review contemporary thinking on 
management in business organisations. As noted above, we will restrict ourselves here 
to a consideration of management in business organisations operating under Anglo-
American capitalism, partly because this is where the main literature in this area 
originates and partly because it is here that MacIntyre‟s critique is of particular 
relevance. 
 
MacIntyre’s critics 
There are a number of writers who have responded directly to MacIntyre‟s critique. 
From these we can identify certain points of agreement and, not surprisingly, several 
points of contention. On the positive side, Mangham‟s summary is instructive and is 
worth citing at length: 
 
“There appears to be a measure of support for some of MacIntyre‟s assertions: 
managers are central to our society (perhaps more central than the 
distinguished philosopher thought); there is evidence that they treat others and 
are treated themselves as means rather than ends – that they manipulate and 
are manipulated; there is evidence that – at least at the time MacIntyre was 
writing – some of them claim to be following law-like generalizations which 
will enhance efficiency; there is evidence that they (or some who write, as it 
were, on their behalf) claim moral neutrality for much of their action; there is 
evidence that the Manager separates his/her self from his/her professional role; 
and there is some evidence that when managers do indulge in moral argument 
they may become confused and may experience stress. Some of this evidence 
is thin but, overall, MacIntyre does not appear to have been too far out in 
making his claims.” (Mangham 1995: 195, emphasis in original) 
 
Mangham‟s statement finds varying degrees of support in the work of Anthony 
(1986), Deetz (1995), du Gay (1998; 2000)
6
 and Roberts (1984). On the other side, 
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however, there are various points of contention. The first is from Anthony (1986) who 
argues that MacIntyre (possibly through no fault of his own) has accepted a mistaken 
account of management. Instead, Anthony argues, managerial authority must have a 
moral foundation which “is finally likely to rest upon a degree of public consensus as 
to the goods that management produces, upon, when the batteries of instrumental 
techniques are set aside, what management is understood to be for” (Anthony 1986: 
183), or, in other words, “… the authority of management will derive from the 
community‟s approval for what management does, for its ends” (ibid.: 190). Anthony, 
in effect, suggests that there is no such thing as compartmentalisation and hence that 
all is well. However, this assumes that there is public consensus on the goods that 
management produces and, particularly in relation to business organisations, it is far 
from clear that this is the case, as we shall discuss further below. 
 
The second point of contention is to do with management and the means / end debate. 
Randels (1995: 205), in his response to Mangham, offers a less sympathetic critique 
of MacIntyre‟s views and suggests that his overall assessment of our current moral 
condition is too pessimistic. His main point is that the manager MacIntyre 
characterises must represent at most managers in the middle or lower levels of the 
corporate bureaucracy. “Executives, even if only at the upper level, can discuss what 
constitutes good business, having fewer ends given” (ibid.: 205-6). He cites various 
examples of senior executives influencing the ends of their corporations, suggests that 
the scope of MacIntyre‟s claim is even more limited because not all middle- and 
lower-level managers “are mere policy implementers” (ibid.: 206) and that the 
language of stakeholding (while in its infancy before the initial publication of After 
Virtue in 1981) and of the social responsibility of business in general, indicates that 
the ends of business are by no means simply given.  
 
In effect, Randels‟ challenge is to MacIntyre‟s notion of “predetermined ends”, by 
questioning who does the predetermining. And even if such predetermining occurs 
outside of the bureaucratic organisation (by government, shareholders, the financial 
markets or whoever), Randels questions whether it is not subject to any kind of debate 
as to the legitimacy and morality of those ends by those who represent the 
organisation itself. Do they simply accept the ends without question? Deetz (1995) 
similarly suggests that studies of organisations indicate a more complex story where 
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managers are clearly “not value-neutral or simply economically rational”, and he 
finds, in contrast to the Speer quote above, “little evidence to suggest value neutrality 
is popular or that the „character of efficient technician‟ is a compelling social image” 
(ibid.: 219).  
 
Nash is similarly supportive of this position. She argues against what she terms the 
“reductionist nature” of MacIntyre‟s characterisation: “Few real managers are capable 
of the single-minded opportunism that characterizes the philosopher‟s manager … In 
reality, there are many managerial „types‟, and they display a variety of intellectual 
biases and moral scruples” (Nash 1995: 228). She also argues that few managers 
assume that their role is morally neutral – “we see any number of chief executives and 
first-line supervisors for whom the idea of work is the basis for entertaining a 
commitment to a wide variety of duties towards others” – what Nash has herself 
described as a covenant approach (Nash 1990). She concludes, “in arguing for a fuller 
understanding of moral meaning-making by managers (good and bad), I am not totally 
denying there are strong forces for immorality or incoherency in the postmodern 
psyche and in the dynamics of organized business; but I am reluctant to see no 
potential for moral capacity in the Manager at all, i.e. accepting the demonic view of 
Manager” (Nash 1995: 231). 
 
The point that is being made by Randels, Deetz and Nash is, of course, to do with 
managerial agency. Managers, as human beings, are moral agents and as such it is 
impossible for them to compartmentalise their lives to such an extent that within 
bureaucratic organisations their own agency disappears entirely. Hine summarises this 
well: “MacIntyre‟s unsympathetic characterisation implies a determinism of 
managerial purpose and agency in the service of power” (Hine 2007: 360). That said, 
we will need to return below to the question of degree – to what extent are managers 
sovereign in relation to their own agency, or to what extent is such sovereignty 
constrained by the bureaucratic context? However, we should acknowledge that what 
we do find in the writings of Randels, Deetz and Nash is a more nuanced account of 
the origin of ends than MacIntyre has himself provided. 
 
The third point of contention is more sociological than organisational in nature and 
leads in to the discussion of bureaucratic organisations that follows. It derives from 
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Nash‟s concern not to “lay the blame for our social ills solely at the feet of the 
character of the manager” (Nash 1995: 230). According to Deetz, the problem lies not 
with the character of the manager but with the role that commercial corporations have 
inherited in society. In effect, he locates the problem not at the level of the role of 
manager but at the level of a society which has allowed such organisations so 
dominant a position that even “home and community to which MacIntyre would have 
managers reconnect are themselves thoroughly colonized and instrumentalized. They 
depend upon corporate money, corporate goods and corporate stability. The meaning 
of life has often been reduced to the accumulation of goods – the only apparent certain 
thing in an uncertain world” (Deetz 1995: 221).  
 
This, as we have seen in relation to MacIntyre‟s sympathy for managers who are 
locked inside such bureaucratic organisations and hence into such pre-defined roles, is 
precisely MacIntyre‟s own view. In After Virtue, in relation to the valuing of external 
goods such as profit in economic institutions, MacIntyre bemoans the effect on virtue: 
“We should therefore expect that, if in a particular society the pursuit of external 
goods were to become dominant, the concept of the virtues might suffer first attrition 
and then perhaps something near total effacement, although simulacra might abound” 
(MacIntyre 1985: 196). He is similarly critical when he writes of modern capitalist 
society that, “what constitutes success in life becomes a matter of the successful 
acquisition of consumer goods, and thereby that acquisitiveness which is so often a 
character trait necessary for success in capital accumulation is further sanctioned. 
Unsurprisingly pleonexia, the drive to have more and more, becomes treated as a 
central virtue.” (MacIntyre 1995: xiii). In other words, as we have already seen, 
MacIntyre‟s portrayal of the character of the manager is bound up with his criticism 
of modernity in general, and of contemporary consumer society and Anglo-American 
capitalist business organisations in particular. And the solution must therefore have 
something to do with the environment within which such organisations operate. 
 
We have various points, therefore, made in response to MacIntyre‟s underlying 
critique of modernity and management, that we will need to carry forward. However, 
one frustrating aspect of the work of MacIntyre‟s critics is that they offer little beyond 
critique. In particular, with the exception to a limited extent of Anthony and du Gay, 
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none of the critics have addressed themselves to the solution that MacIntyre has 
himself identified, and to which we will turn in the third part of this paper. 
 
Bureaucratic organisations 
We need now, however, to give further consideration to the organisational focus of 
MacIntyre‟s critique – that of bureaucracy. We have seen that MacIntyre‟s critique is 
universally negative with respect to such organisational types and this for two reasons. 
One is their effect on managerial agency; the second, at least in relation to capitalist 
business organisations, is the ends that they pursue – ends of acquisitiveness, of 
capital accumulation or, more generally as we shall see below, the prioritisation of 
external goods. Three aspects of bureaucracy concern us here. 
 
First, it might be argued that bureaucracy is irrelevant in relation to modern business 
organisations. As business has increasingly moved to what are referred to as market, 
network or post-bureaucratic forms of organisation (Courpasson & Reed 2004; du 
Gay 2004; Hodgson 2004; Salaman 2004), bureaucracy, it might seem, has been both 
vilified and abandoned. But this would be to over-simplify the position. In that a 
distinction should be made between „bureaucracy‟ as a noun describing (generally) 
public sector organisations designed for a particular purpose, and „bureaucratic‟ as an 
adjective describing a style of organising that any organisation might adopt (Hoggett 
2004: 168), it is the latter with which we are concerned. And it has been persuasively 
argued from DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 147) on, and empirically demonstrated 
(see, for example, Hodgson 2004; Karreman & Alvesson 2004), that all modern 
organisations, whether private sector business or otherwise, continue to contain 
elements of bureaucracy and maintain bureaucratic controls. Indeed, there is even 
evidence of re-bureaucratisation in organisations that have attempted to abandon it 
(Hodgson 2004). Hence, it is a question of more or less bureaucratisation (Kallinikos 
2004: 16) rather than whether it exists at all.  
 
Second, it is in the nature of organisations that maintain some element of bureaucratic 
form, with hierarchy and rule-bound behaviour as the key dimensions (Kallinikos 
2004: 16), that they necessarily subordinate the pursuit of individual goals to 
organisational ones (Hoggett 2004; Karreman & Alvesson 2004; Salaman 2004; ten 
Bos & Willmott 2001). This is, of course, precisely the opposite of the managerial 
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agency that Randels, Deetz and Nash were arguing above. As Kallinikos (2004: 23) 
puts it, “the organizational involvement of individuals qua roles implies the 
dissociation of the process of organizing from the emotional and cognitive complexity 
of agents qua persons”, such that, “in one form or another depersonalized conduct has 
been made an indispensable principle of all formal organizing in modernity” (ibid.: 
17).  
 
Third, however, despite this subordination and depersonalisation, bureaucracy claims 
values of its own (du Gay 2004). So while bureaucracy can lead to depersonalisation 
and the stripping of users (of public services) of their humanity (Hoggett 2004: 180), 
it also promotes a certain selflessness to the ideals of public service. Thus, among the 
ethical attributes of the “good bureaucrat” du Gay (2000: 29) includes the “abnegation 
of personal moral enthusiasms”! But he also includes strict adherence to procedure, 
acceptance of hierarchical sub- and super-ordination and commitment to the purposes 
of the office as positive ethical values (ibid.: 29). The assumption here is that these are 
ethical attributes for one of two reasons: either because the ends of the organisation 
are themselves ethical so that subordination to those ends is a good in itself; or 
because the ends are irreducibly plural and incommensurable and it is then not up to 
the bureaucrat to determine between them but to cultivate a “trained indifference” to 
the discourse of “ultimate ends” (ibid.: 31). Certainly, from the perspective of 
business rather than public sector organisations, such an approach would appear to be 
an abdication of moral responsibility. 
 
Du Gay‟s claims for the morality of bureaucracy have some force, particularly where 
the ends of the organisation are clearly seen to be good. But the broad conclusions 
that we can draw from this discussion are that MacIntyre‟s critique of the lack of 
managerial agency in bureaucratic organisations continues to be relevant, and that 
business organisations continue to exhibit such bureaucratic tendencies. 
 
Contemporary thinking on management in business organisations  
The debate that MacIntyre initiated and the literature on bureaucracy have developed 
largely in isolation from the mainstream management and management ethics 
literature. Within this mainstream literature, however, several of the themes that we 
have already identified above have also been discussed. So, for example, we find 
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management‟s role in the means / end debate within Thomas‟ work (2003) as well as 
within the stakeholder literature (Donaldson & Preston 1995; Phillips 2003; Phillips et 
al. 2003) although, like the literature on bureaucracy, stakeholder theory appears to 
abdicate responsibility for the choice of ultimate ends, leaving them to be worked out 
among the normative stakeholders (Phillips et al. 2003). 
 
Another theme in the mainstream literature is concerned with the issue of managerial 
expertise and a set of law-like generalizations with Thomas (2003) suggesting that 
there still remain two views – those who argue that management is an objectively 
rational activity and those who view it as more subjective. Watson (2002) and Parker 
(2002) both express concern at the apparently increasing if not quite universal view 
that managerialism as “a generalized technology of control to everything – horses, 
humans and hospitals” (Parker 2002: 11) is taking over the world, and that this 
technology of control allows managers to drive organisations in the same way as 
engineers drive machines (Watson 2002: 53). Parker does not work through the 
practical implications of his alternative – that management could be replaced with co-
ordination and that co-ordinators should not necessarily be conceived of as a separate 
group or receive a higher status and rewards (Parker 2002: 206). Instead, he bemoans 
the fact that, “at the present time, management cannot be reimagined”, but in its 
managerialist form only refused (ibid.: 210). While there seems to be no closure on 
the debate between objectivity and subjectivity, it is at least possible to say that the 
existence of a fairly common curriculum within business and management schools 
does indicate a body of knowledge that managers can draw on, even though this body 
of knowledge contains contested elements, and that this body of knowledge is being 
increasingly applied in all kinds of organisations, both in the public and private 
sectors. Hence, MacIntyre‟s claim concerning the lack of managerial expertise is, at 
the very least, contested, although there does seem to be more general agreement that 
a set of law-like generalisations that managers can simply apply in any and every 
situation does not exist. 
 
Just as pertinently for our purposes, managerial agency, and an associated 
classification into moral, amoral and immoral management, have also been a recurring 
theme in the mainstream literature (Bird & Waters 1989; Carroll 1987, 2000; Hine 
2007; Ogbonna & Wilkinson 2003; ten Bos & Willmott 2001; Watson 2002). One 
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consistent concern has been that while managerial acts cannot be morally neutral 
“because every such act occurs in the context of relationships in which there is, at the 
very least, a potential for exploitation” (Watson 2002: 448), in practice managers 
either do not or cannot express such moral sentiments. Bird & Waters (1989) may 
have been the first to identify the “moral muteness of managers” in practice, and the 
moral stress they potentially experience as a result, but others have confirmed these 
same issues (Hine 2007; Ogbonna & Wilkinson 2003; ten Bos & Willmott 2001). The 
struggle for managers to maintain their agency, therefore, continues (ten Bos & 
Willmott 2001: 788). 
 
The interesting point about the most recent literature in this area, however, is that, if 
anything, managerial agency is seen to be weakening in the light of increased 
organisational control. In effect, the struggle is between managerial agency on the one 
hand and agency theory on the other, in which managerial agency is deliberately 
curtailed in the interests of the organisation. Studies in financial capitalism and 
corporate governance (Froud et al. 2002; O‟Sullivan 2003; Williams 2000) point to 
the increasingly important role of the financial markets which no longer act as simple 
intermediaries between household savers and investing firms but “act dynamically to 
shape the behaviour of both firms and households” (Froud et al. 2002: 120). There is, 
however, a key difference between UK and US, on the one hand, and French and 
German versions of capitalism, on the other, in this respect (O‟Sullivan 2003; 
Thompson 2003; Williams 2000). While there is some evidence of convergence of 
these two versions of capitalism, the former generally operates a “downsize and 
distribute” strategy compared with the latter‟s “retain and invest” strategy (Williams 
2000: 4) and there is a consequent pressure on management under Anglo-American 
capitalism to deliver results, a pressure which is reinforced by an active market for 
corporate control. Hine, for example, cites a manager who simply stated that, 
“decisions need to be made in the best interests of the business, not your own 
preferences, or those of some vested interest within the organisation” and comments 
that this implies “an instrumental rationality in pursuit of commercial objectives” 
(2007: 363). 
 
Thompson (2003) argues that this is preventing the bargain between employees and 
employers (in which employees took “a share in the responsibility for the business 
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success and competitiveness of the firm in return for companies taking responsibility 
for informing, involving and above all insulating (core) employees from the vagaries 
of the market” (ibid.: 364)) from being kept. This leads to what Thompson refers to as 
“disconnected capitalism”. As corporate governance systems are strengthened to 
reinforce shareholder value (O‟Sullivan 2003), so it seems that the agency of 
managers reduces. And as this agency reduces, the public consensus on the goods that 
management produces (Anthony‟s claim above for the morality of management) also 
seems to become more fragile, particularly as far as employees are concerned. 
Sennett‟s work (1998 and see also Moore 2005a) similarly reinforces this point. 
 
Where does this summary of MacIntyre‟s critics, of bureaucracy and of the current 
situation with regards to the role and morality of management leave us in respect of 
MacIntyre‟s critique? While it is clear that many of the issues that MacIntyre 
identified need some degree of tempering, it also seems clear that the basic tenets of 
his position, at least in respect of managers in business organisations under Anglo-
American capitalism, remain in place. While managerial agency, at least in respect of 
which organisation to join in the first place and, to a lesser extent, whether 
subsequently to exit, may be intact, managerial agency within the business 
organisation is highly constrained, if not completely contained as MacIntyre argued. 
Such business organisations maintain sufficient characteristics of the bureaucratic 
form for MacIntyre‟s critique (but also his slight sympathy for managers working 
within them) also to remain intact. And the increasing financialisation of the 
economies within which these business organisations operate indicates an ultimate 
end purpose for these organisations which is based purely on financial return and 
shareholder value, so embedding pleonexia, (“the drive to have more and more”) as a 
central virtue (MacIntyre 1995: xiii cited above and see also Moore 2005a). The ends, 
therefore, are to a large extent predetermined and the public consensus on the goods 
that management produces, particularly so far as employees are concerned, does not 
seem to exist. 
 
In the light of this, we turn now to a possible solution and one that, as noted above, is 
perhaps paradoxically based on MacIntyre‟s own work. 
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III. MacIntyre’s virtues-goods-practice-institution schema 
 
Goods, practices and institutions 
The significance of MacIntyre‟s work in general and its application to contemporary 
organisations has been addressed elsewhere (Beadle & Moore 2006). From this it is 
clear that MacIntyre‟s arguments for and developments of virtue ethics, and their 
application specifically to the area of business, are already well documented and have 
received critical review (see Beadle 2002; Moore 2002, 2005a, 2005b; Moore & 
Beadle 2006, for example). What follows is, therefore, a succinct summary of the key 
aspects of MacIntyre‟s schema as it relates to the issue addressed in this paper.  
 
We begin by returning to MacIntyre‟s oft-quoted definition of a practice. A practice 
is: 
 
“[a]ny coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and goods involved, are systematically extended.” (MacIntyre 1985: 187) 
 
It is axiomatic in MacIntyre‟s schema, and a point to which we will need to return, 
that only those who participate in the practice can understand and therefore gain the 
internal goods that the practice affords. This is one reason why MacIntyre terms them 
internal goods – “because they can only be identified and recognized by the 
experience of participating in the practice in question. Those who lack the relevant 
experience are incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods” (ibid.: 188-9). This is 
not to say that those who are the beneficiaries of the outputs of the practice – in our 
case the consumers who purchase them – may not be excellent judges of such output, 
nor that they do, in some sense at least, determine the standards of excellence in the 
practice (see Keat 2000: 128-9). But unless they have themselves been practitioners 
they will be unable to appreciate or gain the internal goods of the practice.
7
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Internal goods derived from practices, both the excellence of the products or services 
that result and the perfection of the individual in the process (ibid.: 189-90 and see 
also MacIntyre 1994: 284 and further below), can be contrasted with external goods 
such as survival, reputation, power, profit or, more generally, success, and we have 
already noted MacIntyre‟s prediction of the effects on the virtues if, in a particular 
society, the pursuit of such goods were to become dominant. In order for internal 
goods to be realised it is clear that practices need to flourish, but to do so they require 
institutions to provide for their sustenance:  
 
“Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with ... external 
goods. They are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they 
are structured in terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power 
and status as rewards. Nor could they do otherwise if they are to sustain not 
only themselves, but also the practices of which they are the bearers. For no 
practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions. Indeed 
so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions – and consequently of 
the goods external to the goods internal to the practices in question – that 
institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which 
the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the 
acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for common 
goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the 
institution. In this context the essential feature of the virtues is clear. Without 
them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the 
corrupting power of institutions.” (MacIntyre 1985: 194) 
 
MacIntyre‟s description of institutions and their relationship with practices can be 
applied in almost any context. MacIntyre himself indicates that, “the range of 
practices is wide: arts, sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the making 
and sustaining of family life, all fall under the concept” (ibid.: 188). The argument 
here is that this can be extended to include organisational life in general and business 
organisations in particular. But the essential association and tension between practices 
and institutions, and between internal and external goods, clearly gives the texture of 
organisational life a central dilemma, a dilemma which is explored further below.  
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We can legitimately extend MacIntyre‟s notion of what he refers to as “productive 
crafts” (MacIntyre 1994: 284) to business organisations in general by noting that at 
the core of any such organisation (and organisations in general) there is a practice. 
The particular practice may be fishing, or producing beef or milk, or building houses, 
or it may be providing financial services or mining or retailing.  The entirely common 
feature, however, is that all such activities fall within MacIntyre‟s definition of a 
practice as “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity”.8 
 
Furthermore, it follows that individuals would do well to view themselves as 
craftspersons and their work in business organisations as set in the context of a 
practice. This would be only one of a number of practices in which they engage, but is 
no less important than any other practice – indeed, quite possibly more important 
given the amount of time and energy, physical and emotional, expended there. If they 
endeavour to maintain an integrity of character by exercising the virtues, here as 
elsewhere, gaining such internal goods as are available, then not only would the 
individuals benefit – be “perfected through and in her or his activity” (MacIntyre 
1994: 284) – but they would, in the very act of doing all of this, play a necessary part 
in the humanising of business from within.
9
  But what is it that enables the individual 
in a business organisation, the craftsperson, to seek and realise such perfection, or 
indeed to have that aim frustrated? To answer this question requires further 
commentary on MacIntyre‟s notion of virtue and its relationship to goods, practices 
and institutions. 
 
Virtues and institutional governance 
MacIntyre links virtues, goods and practices specifically: 
 “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends 
to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of 
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” (MacIntyre 1985: 
191) 
Virtues, therefore, as enduring character traits, are not practice-specific, but are 
exercised in each of the practices in which an individual engages and are necessary to 
the flourishing of each such practice. The virtues enable the individual to achieve the 
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goods internal to practices, and the achievement of those goods across a variety of 
practices and over time is instrumental in the individual‟s search for and movement 
(their narrative quest) towards their own telos.  
 
But we now need to consider a further aspect of MacIntyre‟s schema and one which is 
particularly important to the argument here concerning the morality of management. 
MacIntyre argues that: 
 
“the making and sustaining of forms of human community – and therefore of 
institutions – itself has all the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a 
practice which stands in a peculiarly close relationship to the exercise of the 
virtues … For the ability of a practice to retain its integrity will depend on the 
way in which virtues can be and are exercised in sustaining the institutional 
forms which are the social bearers of the practice” (MacIntyre 1985: 194-5, 
emphasis added).  
 
In other words, there is a second practice involved in any practice-institution 
combination – the practice of making and sustaining the institution. And it is clear that 
management will be particularly concerned with this second practice – although a 
fuller consideration of this point is reserved to a later discussion.
10
 With this piece of 
MacIntyre‟s schema in place, however, we can now return to the central dilemma of 
his schema – the tension between the practice and the institution, despite them 
forming “a single causal order”. MacIntyre notes that, “practices are often distorted by 
their modes of institutionalisation, when irrelevant considerations relating to money, 
power and status are allowed to invade the practice” (MacIntyre 1994: 289). The 
point, therefore, is that aside from individuals‟ own virtuous character (or otherwise), 
the mode of institutionalisation and the extent to which it mistakenly prioritises 
external goods, is fundamental to enabling craftspersons to seek and realise perfection 
in their practice, or indeed to have that aim frustrated. Thus an important part of the 
whole virtues-goods-practice-institution schema is to focus on the institution in order 
to assess what features of the institution will better enable it not to distort the practice 
that it houses.  
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The character of the virtuous institution 
Evidence from a variety of studies (Akaah and Riordan 1989; Baumhart 1961; 
Brenner and Molander 1977, for example) highlights the importance of peer and 
superior influence on the ethical behaviour of managers. Weaver summarises this 
well: “In actual, everyday organizations, key to the development of virtuous and 
vicious identities in organizations will be factors such as leaders‟ behaviour, peer and 
group behaviour, and the embedded cultural norms of an organization” (2006: 352), 
but he also points to a related danger that, “this can also lead to role transference, in 
which actors who positionally represent the organization (e.g. top-level management) 
are assumed to possess moral identity and to exercise moral agency on behalf of all in 
the organization, so that lower-level members think and act as though moral agency is 
not their responsibility” (ibid.: 352).  
 
It has been argued (Klein 1988 and Moore 2005b) that an appropriate way of 
conceptualising this is to think not just in terms of particular individuals and their 
exercise (or not) of the virtues at the institutional level, as MacIntyre does, but also in 
terms of institutional level virtues (and vices), and hence of institutional character. 
Just as MacIntyre talks of the concern for external goods and the acquisitiveness and 
competitiveness of the institution, it seems perfectly possible, by way of analogy or 
projection (Goodpaster & Matthews 1982: 135), or by way of metaphor (Morgan 
1997: 4-8 and passim), to speak of the institution as having a virtuous or vicious 
character, or a character that is somewhere between these two extremes. Klein 
comments that, “formal organizations can function like a moral person … they 
potentially have something analogous to character, which can be evaluated as virtuous 
or vicious” (Klein 1988: 56). 
 
A virtuous institutional character, then, might be defined as the seat of the virtues 
necessary for an institution to engage in practices with excellence, focusing on those 
internal goods thereby obtainable, while warding off threats from its own inordinate 
pursuit of external goods and from the corrupting power of other institutions in its 
environment with which it engages (see Moore 2005b: 661). This is not to say that 
some institutions in the organisation‟s environment may not exercise a positive effect 
on the institution – a point to which we will return below. But in essence this 
approach separates out organisational culture (and its association with values) as 
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essentially institutionally-oriented and therefore primarily a means to the end of 
external goods, from institutional character (and its association with virtues) which is 
practice-oriented and thereby a means to the end of internal goods (ibid.: 668). 
 
Taking business organisations as a particular form of practice-institution combination 
(a form which MacIntyre, as we have seen, terms “productive crafts”) and drawing 
from the definition of virtuous institutional character given above, the concept of the 
virtuous business organisation can be developed further. The first requirement of a 
business organisation with a virtuous character would be that there is a good 
purpose
11
 for the particular practice-institution combination that it comprises. Second, 
the institution would be aware that it is founded on and has as its most important 
function the sustenance of the particular business practice that it houses and 
following from this, the organisation would encourage the pursuit of excellence in 
that practice whatever that may mean for the particular practice in question. Third, it 
would focus on external goods (such as survival, profit and reputation) as both a 
necessary and worthwhile function of the organisation (they are goods, not bads), but 
only to the extent necessary to the sustenance and development of the practice. 
Fourth, the organisation would be such as to be able to resist the corrupting power of 
organisations in its environment with which it in turn relates, such as competitors, 
suppliers or those which represent the financial market, where these encourage a 
single-minded concentration on external goods. 
 
A virtuous organisation would also embody a number of other features (Moore 
2005b). These are the development of a power-balanced structure that will ensure that 
the views and desires of particular constituencies are not privileged over those of 
others, and decision-making systems and processes that enable rational critical 
dialogue having the effect of countering biases and enabling the questioning of the 
hitherto unquestioned. In particular, these will allow the organisation not to see itself 
as compartmentalised from other institutions in society but as one part of a larger 
whole. While to some extent outside of its control, the encouragement of a supportive 
culture, as defined above with its focus on external goods, will also be a feature of the 
character of a virtuous business organisation.
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But under which kinds of circumstance, would such business organisations be 
possible, or even flourish? 
Preconditions for virtuous business organisations 
According to MacIntyre: 
 
 “The integrity of a practice causally requires the exercise of the virtues by at 
least some of the individuals who embody it in their activities; and conversely 
the corruption of institutions is always in part at least an effect of the vices.” 
(MacIntyre 1985: 195) 
 
The first precondition for a virtuous business organisation, then, is the presence of 
virtuous agents at the level of both the core practice and the institution, for without 
agents who possess and exercise the virtues the core practice itself would no longer be 
fostered internally through the pursuit of excellence, and at the institutional level the 
corruption of the institution and the consequent distortion of the practice would seem 
to be inevitable. This is particularly the case for those agents who hold decision-
making authority in the institution. But the presence of such agents at both practice 
and institutional level is clearly insufficient to guarantee the presence of 
organisational virtue. 
 
The second precondition for a virtuous business organisation is the mode of 
institutionalisation (MacIntyre 1994: 289, cited above) which distributes both 
decision-making authority and decision criteria within institutions. In other words, we 
would expect that different institutional forms will support to different extents the 
core practices which they house, and thereby enable the exercise of the virtues and the 
attainment of internal goods to a greater or lesser degree. Weaver makes this point 
well and links it back to the moral agency of individuals: “… organizations 
themselves – and the way they normalise and reproduce virtue or vice – become the 
primary influence on the moral identity of their employees, and thus on the degree of 
virtue characterizing those employees” (2006: 356). 
 
The third precondition for a virtuous business organisation is a conducive 
environment. It is clear that MacIntyre regards organisations as open systems that are 
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both affected by other institutions in society and are capable (in both positive and 
negative ways) of compartmentalising themselves from them. It is apparent therefore 
that a particularly significant factor in any organisation‟s ability to maintain and 
exercise the virtues and support the core practice it houses is the extent to which the 
environment is more or less conducive to such activity, and we would expect that an 
unconducive environment would be problematic for organisational virtue. And, as 
noted above, a conducive environment will be one with institutions that encourage 
virtue by not prioritising external goods, but allow and even encourage the virtuous 
business organisation to focus on the practice. 
 
This suggests that, while a conducive environment is clearly beneficial to 
organisational virtue, it may be possible for organisations to resist their environment, 
or potentially to create around themselves a more conducive environment than most 
organisations experience. Moore & Beadle (2006) give the example of Traidcraft plc, 
(the UK‟s leading Fair Trade organisation) and its ability, in effect, to create around 
itself a micro-climate, (consisting particularly of shareholders, Fair Trader customers 
and developing country suppliers all of which prioritise the internal goods of the 
practice over external goods), within which organisational virtue could indeed 
flourish. Weaver, again, summarises this well: “So it is necessary for policy makers to 
pay attention to how larger, macrocultural forces advance or inhibit the development 
of moral identity in organizations. But managers of organizations need to recognize 
their responsibility for influencing the larger macrocultural setting, so as to make it 
more hospitable to organizations that welcome moral identity and moral agency. In 
virtue-oriented theories, moral agents are responsible for choosing and changing the 
organizational situations in which moral identity either thrives or dies” (2006: 361). 
 
 
IV. The role of management and the morality of management within MacIntyre’s 
schema 
 
It is, I hope, clear from all that has been said that management can be located within 
MacIntyre‟s schema. But it is important that we clarify exactly where it is located 
before drawing out the implications for both management practice and the morality of 
management. There have been previous attempts to classify management as a 
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practice, on MacIntyre‟s definition, in its own right (Brewer 1997; McCann & 
Brownsberger 1990). However, one suspects that this would obtain a similar response 
from MacIntyre as he gave when asked whether teaching was a practice: 
 
“teaching itself is not a practice, but a set of skills and habits put to the service 
of a variety of practices. The teacher should think of her or himself as a 
mathematician, a reader of poetry, an historian or whatever, engaged in 
communicating craft and knowledge to apprentices (MacIntyre and Dunne 
2002: 5) … It is part of my claim that teaching is never more than a means, 
that it has no point and purpose except for the point and purpose of the 
activities to which it introduces students. All teaching is for the sake of 
something else and so teaching does not have its own goods. The life of a 
teacher is therefore not a specific kind of life.” (ibid.: 9) 
 
While this enraged educational philosophers at the time, and has led to continued and 
animated debate (see Dunne & Hogan 2004), the point here is that management is 
equally not a practice in and of itself, but that, just as teachers are teachers of 
something (mathematics, literature, history), so managers are managers of something – 
the practice at the core of the practice-institution combination – and are also engaged 
in the separate but related practice of making and sustaining the institution that houses 
this core practice.
12
 This might disappoint managers, though it should also be pointed 
out that, as we established above, there is a generic body of knowledge that managers 
can draw on. This generic body of knowledge concerns, on this understanding, the 
practice of making and sustaining institutions – the body of knowledge forms the core 
of the craft into which such practitioners (managers) need to be apprenticed. But that 
this knowledge needs to be applied specifically to the practice-institution combination 
in question and can never be abstracted entirely from its context should also be clear. 
It may be helpful to depict this as follows: 
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The point is that, on MacIntyre‟s schema, all those who are engaged in any level of 
management
13
 have two practices with which they must concern themselves. First-line 
supervisors, as the most junior level of management, are, of course, mostly involved 
in the core practice and have only a small involvement in the institutional practice. 
But they do have some involvement – by definition they are also engaged in the 
practice of making and sustaining the institution even if only to a limited extent. And 
correspondingly, senior management at the other end of the spectrum, while mainly 
involved in the institutional practice, should never forget that they also have an 
involvement in the practice at the core. An essential element of management at any 
level, then, is to understand and maintain an involvement with the core practice – to 
appreciate and indeed gain, at least to some extent, its internal goods. But in addition, 
within the practice of making and sustaining the institution, managers should equally 
be concerned with the exercise of the virtues, with the pursuit of excellence and, in the 
same way, should thereby receive the internal goods available. 
 
With this in place, we are now in a position to return to a number of the issues that we 
identified earlier in our attempt to re-imagine management and hence locate and give 
substantive content to its morality. The first point we need to return to is that of the 
means-end debate. And it is clear from the above that there is a requirement on all 
managers, but particularly those at the senior level, to ensure that the particular 
organisation with which they are concerned has a good purpose. In other words, while 
Core practice 
Institutional practice 
Increasing level of management  
Increasing concern with ends 
Decreasing concern with means  
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MacIntyre‟s view was that ends are already given, we need to acknowledge the 
argument, supported with evidence from practice, that Randels, Deetz and Nash 
produced and agree that managers should never confine themselves to a consideration 
only of means to achieve predetermined ends, but must constantly consider and, if 
necessary, challenge the ends for which the organisation is established. This may be 
particularly difficult for those engaged in areas of business such as tobacco or the 
arms trade, where making the moral case is clearly problematic. 
 
The second point is that managers should be primarily concerned with the practice at 
the core of the practice-institution combination, both to ensure its sustenance and to 
encourage it in its pursuit of excellence. That this will require managers at all levels to 
understand the practice at its core should be evident and this may be particularly 
challenging for those who transfer from one industry to another. A rapid 
apprenticeship in the core practice will then be required.
14
 It will also be a challenge 
to those involved in holding companies which, in effect, buy and sell practice-
institution combinations without necessarily paying much, if any, attention to the 
nature of the core practice. The pursuit of excellence in the core practice will, of 
course, enable those primarily engaged in it (all of whom are craftspeople) to attain 
the internal goods available, so helping them on their narrative quest towards their 
own telos, such that there is not only a good product or service but that the 
craftsperson is “perfected through and in her or his activity”.  
 
In order to ensure the maintenance of and pursuit of excellence in the core practice, 
managers must, thirdly, pay sufficient attention to external goods but, as we identified 
earlier, only to the extent that this is necessary. In other words, the pursuit of external 
goods for themselves should not be the primary concern of managers. Getting the 
balance right – pursuing sufficient external goods but not prioritising them – is clearly 
a challenging assignment and one in which the virtues of phronesis (practical 
judgment) together with courage to resist those institutions, particularly those in the 
external environment which may seek to enforce a single-minded concentration on 
external goods, will be particularly necessary. 
 
This, then, leads to a fourth point which is that one of the primary responsibilities for 
managers is to establish and maintain the character of the organisation. This was 
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defined above as the seat of the virtues necessary for an institution to engage in 
practices with excellence and, in line with Weaver cited above, recognises that, “… 
organizations themselves – and the way they normalise and reproduce virtue or vice – 
become the primary influence on the moral identity of their employees, and thus on 
the degree of virtue characterizing those employees” (2006: 356). 
 
Organisational character is linked to the mode of institutionalisation. We noted earlier 
that different modes of institutionalisation and the extent to which they prioritise 
external goods would have a direct effect on the ability to sustain and encourage 
excellence in the core practice. Moore (2005a: 240) identified examples of such senior 
managers that took their organisations into or out of public ownership and their 
concerns over the effect of the financial markets on the organisations‟ values. (More 
recent concern over the burgeoning “private equity” industry, however, may suggest 
that there are advantages to public ownership, particularly to the transparency which 
capital markets require – see, for example, Thornton (2007).) Moore & Beadle (2006: 
381-4), by contrast, highlight the particular mode of institutionalisation that Traidcraft 
plc has adopted and show how this is supportive of organisational virtue. That 
managers, then, and particularly senior managers, have a responsibility to determine 
the mode of institutionalisation of their organisations is clear and is the fifth point in 
relation to the role of managers. This will also involve ensuring the other features that 
we noted earlier – a power-balanced structure, systems and processes that enable 
rational critical dialogue and a supportive culture – are enabled. 
 
It was noted above that one of the other preconditions for virtuous organisations is the 
presence of virtuous agents at both the core practice and institution levels. And it is 
clearly management‟s responsibility to ensure that such agents are recruited in the 
first place and then nurtured. This might well pose something of a challenge to 
methods of recruitment and selection which tend to focus on knowledge, skills and 
abilities together with an emphasis on personality rather than character – see, for 
example, Robertson and Smith (2001). Where character is assessed in the selection 
process it seems often to be reduced to Organisational Citizenship Behaviour (though 
see also Hodson (1999) for the concept of Management Citizenship Behaviour). 
Although such aspects are clearly important, particularly given the emphasis here on 
excellence in the practice, character assessment and development in employees is the 
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sixth point in relation to the role of managers. Like many of the points developed 
here, there is an element of „chicken and egg‟ associated with this, and it is likely to 
be easier for those organisations that are already virtuous to attract and develop 
virtuous employees. For an organisation that judges itself to be far from virtuous but 
wishes to move in that direction, recruitment and development of virtuous employees 
may well be both particularly necessary and particularly challenging. 
 
The seventh and final point is that there is the related requirement, again particularly 
of senior managers, to attempt to produce a conducive environment within which 
organisational virtue can flourish. That the environment cannot just be considered as 
a given, a factor within which managers have to work but cannot influence, should be 
clear from the earlier discussion and this accepts the critique of MacIntyre made by 
Nash and Deetz, that the context for management is important and not all of the blame 
can be laid at the manager‟s door. It may, however, be possible for managers to 
influence their environment and while this is partially to do with choice in the mode 
of institutionalisation, it is also a more general requirement on managers “for 
choosing and changing the organizational situations in which moral identity either 
thrives or dies” (Weaver 2006: 361, cited above). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Where does this leave the morality of management? Are managers simply the 
morally-neutral efficient achievers of predetermined ends? Clearly, on this account, 
the answer is no. For on this account there is considerable potential for the morality of 
management to become established. The manipulative mode in which managers were 
said to operate is no longer necessarily the case. In determining (or at least taking part 
in the determination of or in the questioning of) ends, managers regain an essential 
part of their agency. By focussing on the core practice, ensuring its sustenance and 
pursuit of excellence, managers move from manipulators to participants. Might this, 
in the process, relieve the moral stress that managers experience? Certainly it should, 
since morality is then a central concern of managers and moral muteness should no 
longer be a problem to anything like the same extent. In the process, Parker‟s 
concerns – that management should not necessarily be accorded special status or 
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rewards and that management might be better conceived as a co-ordinating 
mechanism – might also be addressed.15 
 
Managers, by re-imagining their role in this way, would be participating in two 
practices (amongst others that their de-compartmentalised lives would consist of). As 
managers become more senior, their concern comes to be increasingly with the 
practice of making and sustaining the institution, and the pursuit of excellence in this 
practice should be just as demanding and just as rewarding as the pursuit of 
excellence in the core practice. In other words, those who have, in one sense, 
outgrown the core practice and now represent the institution that houses it, also have 
the same opportunity to exercise the virtues in the making and sustaining of the 
institution, and thereby have the same opportunity to attain the relevant internal goods 
enabling them on their own narrative quest towards their own telos. The exercise of 
the virtues is appropriate at this level also. 
 
It will also be clear from all of this that management is an art, not a science, and that, 
while there is a whole series of guidelines for effective practice in the making and 
sustaining of institutions – a generic body of knowledge applicable at the institutional 
level – it does not possess a set of law-like generalizations. Managers must learn their 
craft in exactly the same way as other trades and professions, and their craft will have 
both generic elements applicable to any institution and specific elements applicable to 
that particular institution and to that particular core practice. 
 
I have argued that the morality of management is particularly problematic in business 
organisations operating under Anglo-American capitalism. And while the conceptual 
framework that I have developed has been applied specifically to these types of 
organisation to resolve the issue of the morality of management by re-imagining 
management itself, I would propose that the conceptual framework is generically 
applicable to all types of organisation. I have not been able to comment on the 
possibility that there may be other such organisations (perhaps in the public or 
voluntary sectors, business organisations operating under other forms of capitalism 
(see Keat 2008), co-operatives and so on) that are already operating, in effect, within 
this conceptual framework and in which the amorality or immorality of management 
is not at issue. However, to the extent that such organisations display characteristics 
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similar to business organisations under Anglo-American capitalism – predetermined 
ends, unwarranted limitations on managerial agency, an unbalanced focus on external 
goods – one would predict that the issue of the morality of management is similarly 
problematic and that the solution identified here is similarly applicable. 
 
And Speer, where does this leave the Speers of this world – “the pure technician, the 
classless bright young man without background, with no other original aim than to 
make his way in the world and no other means than his technical and managerial 
ability”? In whichever type of organisation the Speers of this world may appear, 
perhaps, with this understanding, we may even be able to re-educate them to become 
truly moral managers. 
 
Notes 
I would like to thank participants at the European Business Ethics Network-UK Association‟s 2004 
conference, the Society for Business Ethics‟ 2005 conference, the Alasdair MacIntyre‟s Revolutionary 
Aristotelianism: Ethics, Resistance and Utopia conference in 2007, Gary Weaver and three anonymous 
reviewers for comments on previous versions of this paper, together with Ron Beadle for our joint 
work which has informed this paper. 
1. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that, unlike Adolf Eichmann (see Arendt 
1963), Speer was not hanged when the allies had him in their power – probably the highest ranking 
Nazi who was not hanged or condemned to death in absentia. The difference between Eichmann and 
Speer was that while Eichmann came to be at the very heart of the Nazi machinery of death, Speer 
confined himself to the management of organisations which were not principally focused on „crimes 
against humanity‟. Ten Bos & Willmott (2001: 782) argue that many of those who participated in Nazi 
genocide were not themselves „inhuman‟ monsters but rule-abiding employees who had developed a 
“calculating instinct” for their private interests. They argue further that “bureaucracy is a type of 
organization that allows, and indeed encourages, its members to develop this „calculating instinct‟ ” 
(ibid.: 782). 
2. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that there are resonances with Goffman‟s 
(1969) work in MacIntyre‟s use of theatrical metaphors. 
3. Such law-like generalizations in the organisational context would have to be of the form, “In 
organisations, if x, then y”, and not, “In organisations, if x, then y, provided conditions a, b, c etc. hold 
over the extended period in question”. It is challenging to find any examples of the former formulation 
for anything other than the most trivial of situations, and equally challenging to specify all of the 
conditions a, b, c etc., that would need to hold for y to follow from x in situations that are non-trivial. 
By contrast, in the natural sciences such statements are manifestly straightforward – as in, “If I drop 
this apple, then it will fall”. 
4. The four sources of systematic unpredictability are: the nature of radical conceptual innovation 
(which is, of course, inherently unpredictable); the unpredictability of certain of his own actions by 
each agent individually; the unpredictability that arises from the game-theoretic character of social life; 
and finally the pure contingency of chance.  
5. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that Merton‟s (1940) concept of “trained 
incapacity” in bureaucratic structures might be applicable here, with managers trained to focus on 
effectiveness and efficiency and so professionally incapable of dealing with questions of morality. 
6. Du Gay, while partially supportive, is on balance highly critical of MacIntyre‟s position, but his 
critique is not central to our concerns here. 
7. An example would be my watching (“consumption”) of a cricket match where I can appreciate a 
superb cover drive because I played cricket in my youth and (once) hit such a shot. My wife is unable 
to appreciate cricket in that sense. Our positions are reversed when we go to watch a live performance 
of classical music. 
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8. I acknowledge that in my earlier work, particularly Moore (2002), I confused the issue by stating that 
business was a practice. It is now clear to me that business generically cannot be a practice, but that 
business organisations can be usefully re-described as practice-institution combinations. Within this re-
description we always need to specify the practice itself – as here with fishing etc.. I am grateful to Ron 
Beadle for his assistance in helping to clarify this point. It is also quite possible, within this schema, 
however, that a particular mode of institutionalisation is such as to effectively prevent practice-like 
features within it. However, I have argued elsewhere (Moore 2005b: 679) that all business activities, 
irrespective of their form of institutionalisation, must contain the vestiges of a practice and the virtues 
to some degree, for if they did not – that is, if the institution had „won‟ so completely that the virtues 
had suffered “something near total effacement” (MacIntyre, 1985: 196) – then the institution would 
have, in effect, „killed‟ itself from the inside by failing to sustain the practice on which it itself is 
founded. 
9. For a further exploration of what it means to be a craftsperson operating in a practice see Moore 
(2005a). 
10. It should be noted that this second practice of making and sustaining institutions will also require its 
own institutionalization. There is not space here to consider the legal, governance, social custom and 
other elements of this informal institutionalisation, although the role of business and management 
schools in this might be a profitable area for further consideration. 
11. I have previously used the term just purpose (Moore, 2005b; Moore & Beadle 2006) but on further 
consideration the notion of good purpose is both wider ranging and more appropriate. 
12. In correspondence between Beadle and MacIntyre (Beadle 2002: 52 and also reported in Moore 
2002: 24), MacIntyre confirmed that, “ „Employment‟ is not for me the name of either a type of 
practice or a type of institution or organisation, but rather one feature of the lives of certain types of 
institution or organisation”. Beadle continues, “If this is the case for employment then so is it the case 
for management”. 
13. There is not space here to include discussion on the differences between administration, 
management and leadership. The diagram might helpfully be used to illustrate the gradual and hard-to-
distinguish movement from predominantly administration at the left hand side to predominantly 
leadership at the right. I am, however, using management as a generic term to cover all three. 
14. In my early industrial career I had as my line manager a Director of Operations who had transferred 
from one part of the group involved in textiles to our part involved in paint manufacture. It emerged at 
some point that prior to his transfer he had spent a day at a paint company personally making a batch of 
paint. He, I think, understood something of the need to have a „feel‟ for the core practice. 
15. In effect, the argument is that MacIntyre‟s schema, when elaborated and applied in the way it is 
here, has done Parker‟s work for him in re-imagining management. 
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